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Resilience of UK Infrastructure 
 
National infrastructure, such as transport, 
energy, water supplies and communications, is 
essential to the UK. Investment is needed to 
protect it from existing natural hazards and any 
effects of future climate change. This briefing 
outlines efforts to improve the resilience of 
infrastructure to these risks. Vulnerability due to 
the interdependence of different infrastructure 
components, where failure of one may lead to 
failure of others, is also discussed. 
 
Overview 
 Recent events have exposed weaknesses 
in the resilience of national infrastructure to 
some natural hazards, such as flooding. 
 The UK has begun to address this 
vulnerability through the Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience Programme. 
 New and existing infrastructure must be 
prepared for effects of long-term climate 
change, such as higher temperatures. 
 Population increase over the next 20 years, 
especially in the South East of England, will 
place extra pressure on UK infrastructure. 
 Better knowledge about the risks of 
infrastructure failure and the impact of 
interdependence between components is 
necessary to improve overall resilience. 
 Some have suggested a new authority to 
oversee the future of UK infrastructure. 
Background 
The government defines the UK‟s national infrastructure (NI) 
as “facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the 
functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential 
services upon which daily life in the UK depends”.
1
 It 
identifies nine areas as NI: energy, transport, water, 
communications, food, health care, emergency services, 
financial services and government itself. This POSTnote 
considers some of the issues surrounding the resilience of 
the first four, which provide the core infrastructure on which 
the remaining five depend. Issues include: 
 Short-term hazards: flooding during the summer of 2007 
(see Box 1) cost an estimated £3.2 billion. The 
subsequent report, The Pitt Review: Learning Lessons 
from the 2007 Floods,
2
 has set out the need to address 
resilience to current hazards.  
 Long-term climate change: climate change may 
increasingly affect NI. The Climate Change Act 2008 
requires the government to report on climate change risk 
and prepare adaptation strategies. 
 Interdependence: the national infrastructure is a highly 
interconnected network both within and between sectors. 
Failure in one area can spread unexpectedly to others.  
The need to meet greenhouse gas emissions targets, such 
as the 80% emission reduction by 2050, to replace ageing 
infrastructure and respond to population rise and changing 
patterns of demand are also key motives for investment. 
Box 1. The Summer Floods of 2007  
The vulnerability of national infrastructure was dramatically highlighted 
during the summer of 2007, when widespread flooding led to power 
failures and loss of water supplies throughout Gloucestershire, 
Worcestershire and East Yorkshire. However, it was recognition of 
narrowly avoided disasters that made clear the need for a more 
systematic approach to resilience planning. 
Key Areas of Damage  
 Flooding of the Mythe water treatment works in Gloucestershire led 
to the loss of water supplies to 350,000 people for up to 17 days. 
 Heavy rainfall resulted in bank-slipping incidents and flooding on 
the rail network causing delays in the service and subsequent 
delay in the supply of fuel.  
 Motorway closures affected large parts of the road network. Repair 
costs of local and trunk roads were estimated at £40-60 million.  
 Damage to electricity distribution assets cut off 40,000 people in 
Gloucestershire for 24 hours. In Yorkshire and Humberside 9000 
customers were placed on rota disconnection (rolling blackouts) for 
several days. 
Near-misses 
 Walham substation in Gloucestershire came close to failure. This 
would have meant the loss of power to 500,000 people in 
Gloucestershire and South Wales. 
 A near breach of the Ulley Reservoir dam threatened other 
infrastructure assets including the M1 motorway, a major electricity 
substation and a gas network connection for Sheffield. 
Source: The Pitt Review, Chapter 14 
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Governance 
Following recommendations from The Pitt Review, a Natural 
Hazards Team (NHT) was set up in the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat at the Cabinet Office. Its role is to establish a 
cross-sector resilience programme between the 
government, regulators and industry, to address the short-
term (0-5 years) vulnerability of NI to natural hazards.  
The NHT seeks to encourage better practice and to foster 
cooperation between operators. To this end, it has 
established a Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme 
(CIRP); where Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is 
defined as those assets whose loss would lead to “severe 
economic or social consequences”.
1
 However, in the private 
sector, which accounts for the majority of national 
infrastructure, investment in resilience remains the 
responsibility of individual companies and market regulators. 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra) leads a cross-departmental project examining how 
to increase the resilience of NI to future climate impacts 
(see „Long-Term Climate Change‟ below). Nevertheless, 
several bodies, such as the Council for Science and 
Technology, have expressed concern that no single 
authority for national infrastructure exists
3
 (see p4).  
Short-Term Resilience to Natural Hazards 
As part of the CIRP, government departments which deal 
with aspects of national infrastructure are working with the 
NHT to develop Sector Resilience Plans (SRPs). The first 
version of these plans identified the present level of 
resilience of CNI to flooding. The SRPs form part of a longer 
consultation leading to a National Resilience Plan for Critical 
Infrastructure due in 2011. This will seek to address all 
current risks identified by the Cabinet Office‟s National Risk 
Register, such as storms and heat-waves. 
The level and type of protection needed for an infrastructure 
component depends on the risks involved: that is, an 
assessment of the consequences of losing a component 
combined with the probability of such loss. Furthermore, 
improving resilience can be approached in a number of 
ways, for example, by: 
 reducing risk - relocating key sites away from hazards; 
 mitigating risk - investing in protection and defences; 
 preparing for consequences - contingency planning to 
ensure alternative supplies, reserve capacity, or the rapid 
restoration of services. 
Risk assessment helps to provide for the effective targeting 
of resources by making economic cases for the most 
appropriate actions. A key part of the SRPs has been to 
identify the most crucial components of NI and try to 
establish the consequences of their loss to other assets.  
The first iteration of the Sector Resilience Plans was 
completed in March 2010 and focused on vulnerability of 
components to flooding. The plans set an initial resilience 
standard for CNI assets at 0.5% annual flooding probability, 
meaning protection to a level that has a 1 in 200 chance of 
being equalled or exceeded each year
1
 (see Box 2).  
Because risks change over time it is necessary to re-
evaluate risk and to modify resilience strategies continually. 
However, there are no fixed plans for the form of any 
transition between the short-term work started by the NHT 
and the long-term implications of climate change. 
Long-Term Climate Change 
The Defra-led cross-government Adapting to Climate 
Change (ACC) programme has identified infrastructure 
adaptation as a priority. In April 2009, the ACC started a 
cross-departmental project Adapting Infrastructure to 
Climate Change to examine how to increase the resilience 
of NI to future climate impacts. It is due to report its findings 
and recommendations for increasing long-term climate 
resilience in March 2011. 
The most recent set of UK Climate Change projections for 
the coming century, UKCP09, predict hotter and drier 
summers, warmer and wetter winters and more frequent 
extreme weather such as heat waves, storms, floods and 
droughts. In addition, sea-level rise (see forthcoming 
POSTnote) is expected to increase the frequency of flooding 
in tidal areas. While flooding is a hazard for all sectors, other 
changes pose specific problems. 
Energy, Transport and Communications Sectors 
After flooding, extreme heat events and gradually rising 
temperatures represent some of the most serious threats to 
infrastructure. In the energy and transport sectors, higher 
temperatures can reduce the capacity of electricity 
Box 2. The March 2010 Sector Resilience Plans 
The first cycle of the Sector Resilience Plans focused on the present 
level of protection of national infrastructure from flooding. Some of the 
findings for each sector are listed below. 
 Water: the water sector is particularly vulnerable to flooding due to 
the position of assets close to lakes and rivers. The CIRP mapping 
exercise identified a total of 63 sites at a risk exceeding the 1 in 200 
year standard. During the most recent price review in 2009, the 
water regulator Ofwat allowed water companies to charge an 
additional £400 million to customer bills for investment in resilience. 
 Energy:  the electricity transmission and distribution companies in 
Great Britain have plans and cost options to provide a target level of 
protection of a 0.1% annual flooding probability (1 in 1000yr) for 
critical assets. A similar exercise is being conducted for gas 
infrastructure. In the price review for the period 2010-2014, Ofgem, 
the energy regulator, permitted electricity companies to collect an 
extra £112 million from customers for flooding resilience. 
 Transport: a large range of transport options (road, rail, aviation and 
shipping) provides alternatives should a given subsector fail. Sector 
operators have thus decided to accept some interruption of service, 
rather than providing extra protection, as the most cost effective 
approach to flood management. The Highways Agency undertakes 
risk assessments monthly of key hazards on major trunk roads and 
motorways. Network Rail operates a similar policy. The majority of 
the rail network is built to withstand a 1% annual flooding probability. 
 Communications:  the 2007 floods had a limited impact on this 
sector but options for 14 sites found to be at risk during the CIRP 
mapping exercise are being discussed. Flooding can prevent 
engineering work on components, such as mobile phone masts, and 
assets may be vulnerable when they depend on other sectors (see 
Box 4). The Digital Economy Act 2010 assigned a duty to the 
communications regulator Ofcom to report on resilience. 
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transmission (though this is likely to be less important than 
increases in demand), lead to melting road surfaces and 
buckling of rail track. Likewise, storms can damage 
transmission lines, bridges, ports and other coastal assets. 
The Department for Transport is researching topics such as 
the degradation of railway and road embankments due to 
changing precipitation patterns and higher temperatures. 
Similar issues threaten communications: assets such as 
telephone exchanges must be kept cool, while 
communication masts require protection from storms. 
Operators will need to prepare by upgrading or retrofitting 
their assets to deal with future conditions.  
Nevertheless, much of the infrastructure technology needed 
for hot or stormy climates already exists in other countries 
and expertise will be transferable. Operators argue that 
robust standards can be introduced in advance of climate 
change impacts. However, there are concerns about the 
cost effectiveness of adaptation measures and a range of 
climate change projections means that it can be difficult for 
operators to know which standards to adopt (see page 4). 
Water Sector 
Though extreme weather, such as periods of heavy rain, will 
place extra demands on drainage and add to the risk of 
flooding, changing precipitation patterns are the greatest 
hazard to the water sector from climate change. Effects will 
differ throughout the country: drier summers and wetter 
winters will leave some regions with more water while others 
are faced with periods of drought.
4
 Replenishment of ground 
water is predicted to reduce by 5-15% and coupled with 
more intermittent rain this will result in lower average river 
flow; in summer by up to 50-80%
5
 in some areas. Reduced 
availability of water will also increase the concentration of 
pollutants,
4
 damaging the environment and raising the cost 
of treatment (see POSTnote 320).  
New sea-water desalination plants and more water storage 
may be necessary to maintain supply during periods of 
drought. However, a combined approach is needed to deal 
with water scarcity: to consider demand as well as supply 
options. More metering could be employed to help to reduce 
water use. In England and Wales only 37% of customers 
have a water meter, while on average, households reduce 
their water consumption by 10% after one is fitted. 
Demographic Change 
The threats to NI associated with climate change are likely 
to be exacerbated by concurrent demographic change as 
greater demand reduces spare capacity. The UK population 
is projected to reach 71.6 million by 2033, an increase of 
16.6% from 2008; much of this will occur in London (19.8% 
increase) and the South East of England (20.1% increase). 
The impact of population growth on water infrastructure is a 
particular concern; the South East of England is already one 
of the most heavily pressured areas in the UK with current 
demand causing „unacceptable damage‟ to the local 
environment during periods of low water flow. Important 
decisions must be made about land use in future adaptation 
strategies, particularly concerning the desirability of 
accommodating a growing population in the South East as 
opposed to encouraging development in other regions.
5
 An 
ageing population and altering lifestyles will also affect 
demands on the NI, particularly the transport sector, as 
people choose to retire or live away from urban areas. 
Infrastructure built now must be prepared for such changes. 
Interdependence  
The highly connected nature of NI is a major concern for 
sector operators trying to improve its resilience. The two 
main forms of interdependence, Cascade Failure and Single 
Point of Failure, are discussed below. 
Infrastructure components often exhibit a chain of 
dependencies. For example, water companies rely on 
energy companies for their power supplies and both sectors 
need communications to coordinate the functioning of their 
assets. Failure of one component in such a chain will thus 
propagate to dependents, a process dubbed Cascade 
Failure. Since neither the extent nor complexity of chains of 
dependence is well known, cascade failure may represent a 
significant threat to infrastructure
3
 (see Box 3).  
When a number of components are dependent on a single 
asset, or type of asset, this becomes a Single Point of 
Failure (SPF). In this sense Regional Convergence, where 
multiple infrastructure components are located in the same 
area, is a form of SPF, and constitutes a risk to resilience by 
magnifying the impact of localised disasters (see Box 3).  
Discussion about how best to address interdependence is in 
its early stages, but some methods may include: 
 Reducing coupling: gaining a better understanding of 
interdependencies, and if possible eliminating them, 
makes it easier to manage consequences of asset failure. 
 Improving diversity: where dependence on supply from 
other assets is unavoidable, ensuring the availability of a 
range of sources can remove single points of failure. 
Box 3. Examples of Interdependence  
Cascade Failure  
 The Cumbrian Floods in 2009 destroyed a bridge carrying 312 fibre 
optic circuits serving 40,000 people, including police and local 
businesses. Disruption to the transport sector due to the collapsed 
bridge was compounded by the loss of communications. 
 Had the Ulley Reservoir dam failed in 2007 and flooded the nearby 
electricity substation and M1 motorway this would have been a case 
of cascade failure (see ‘Near-misses’ in Box 1).  
Single Point of Failure (SPF) 
 Many infrastructure components rely on precise time signals to 
synchronise with other assets. Dependence on signals from Global 
Positioning System (GPS) satellites is now a widespread SPF. 
 In April 2010, a faulty anti-virus update, supplied by the McAfee 
software company, crashed thousands of computers running an 
identical version of the Microsoft Operating System. 
 A recent case study of Humberside has identified three major coal 
fired power stations and renewable energy assets, 17% of the UK’s 
generating capacity, co-located in a region vulnerable to flooding.4 
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Barriers to Improving Resilience 
Investment and Planning 
Planning for future capacity, to replace retiring assets and to 
meet other goals (such as CO2 reduction targets), has a 
central role in long-term resilience. In particular, climate 
change and the changing energy mix (see Box 4) may alter 
how energy infrastructure is used, with greater overall 
consumption of electricity and higher summer demand.  
In March 2010, Infrastructure UK, which advises on the 
planning and delivery of infrastructure investment at HM 
Treasury, published a report identifying a lack of finance for 
large, “complex projects in the low-carbon sector”.
6
 Private 
companies are often unwilling to invest in unproven or 
complex projects such carbon capture and storage (CCS) or 
offshore wind farms. To address this, the government has 
supported the establishment of a Green Investment Bank, 
likely to be funded by a mix of public and private money.  
There is also an acknowledged need for a planning 
framework that can deliver assets quickly. The Planning Act 
2008 established the Infrastructure Planning Commission to 
speed up the planning process, but this has since been 
abolished. The government has proposed streamlining 
public inquiries to reduce unnecessary delays. 
Short-Term Thinking 
Business models which aim to boost short-term efficiency, 
such as those which eliminate spare capacity, may conflict 
with investment in resilience to the detriment of long-term 
performance.
3
 In principle, regulation can help to discourage 
such approaches. For example, in its 2009-2014 review 
Ofwat, the water regulator, promoted long-term planning by 
asking water companies to set their five year business plans 
within a 25 year context. However, the Institution of Civil 
Engineers has criticised the present system of regulation, 
arguing that it focuses too much on consumer price rather 
than “increasing resilience and funding reserve capacity”.
7
 
They propose that government expand regulators‟ remits to 
ensure improvement of resilience is incentivised directly.
7
 
Uncertainties about the expense of adaptation and the 
potential cost of taking no action are also a barrier to 
investment for infrastructure operators trying to target limited 
resources. As part of the ongoing Climate Change Risk 
Assessment (CCRA), provided for in the Climate Change 
Act 2008, Defra has begun an Adaptation Economic 
Analysis, due in 2012. This will assess both the total costs 
of adaptation and those areas where action will have the 
most benefits. The CCRA will be reviewed every five years. 
Interdependence and Governance 
Insufficient knowledge about the level of coupling between 
assets can undermine other attempts to improve resilience. 
In 2004, for example, more than 130,000 telephone lines 
were blocked in the North West due to a fire in a 
communications tunnel; spare capacity was situated next to 
the main cables and, as a consequence, also damaged. 
Furthermore, lack of communication between different 
operators can make it difficult to identify interdependence, to 
establish responsibility for resilience and to target resources 
efficiently. The Council for Science and Technology has 
recommended that a body be established to provide clear 
leadership, to coordinate systems-based approaches (see 
Box 5), to mediate responsibilities, and to oversee both the 
short and long-term planning of national infrastructure.
3
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Box 4. Future Energy Infrastructure 
The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (July 2009) outlines plans for 
40% of UK electricity to come from low-carbon sources by 2020: 
30% supplied by renewable energy and 10% from sources such as 
nuclear power and fossil fuelled power stations equipped with 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology (see POSTnote 335). 
According to the plan, meeting these targets will require a five-fold 
increase of renewable energy on current levels, demonstration CCS 
plants and replacement of existing nuclear power stations, all but 
one of which are due to close by 2023. In addition, investment in 
electricity transmission to serve new assets is needed. To connect 
proposed wind power generation in mid-Wales, for example, the 
National Grid hopes to build a new substation and a 400kV grid 
transmission line by October 2015. Offshore wind and tidal power 
will also require new connections (see forthcoming POSTnote).  
Box 5. The Need for Systems Based Approaches  
The following hypothetical scenario illustrates some of the challenges 
posed by interdependency. Figure 1 depicts a water treatment works 
sourcing its electricity from a neighbouring substation. Resilience to 
flooding by a local river, indicated by dashed lines, is different for each 
of the two assets: the substation is protected to a 1/50yr event and the 
treatment works to 1/200yr.  
Fig. 1: Schematic of an interdependent system 
 
However, in this situation the higher resilience of the treatment works is 
redundant, since it will still be rendered inoperable by cascading failure 
from a 1/50 yr event flooding the substation. Indeed, identical levels of 
protection may seem appropriate. But there is another operator in this 
system: the Environment Agency is responsible for the maintenance of 
the river; it could raise an embankment to protect both the substation 
and the treatment works simultaneously. The most effective resilience 
planning may only be developed by reviewing the system as a whole. 
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